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What Obama Did Right
While not quite in the league of  the Truman-Dewey 
presidential upset of  1948, Barack Obama’s close but 
clean victory over former frontrunner Hillary Clinton 
certainly qualifies as a major political upset. And boy, 
have the post-mortems begun on the failings of  the 
Clinton campaign, which were legion. Over-promoted 
prima donna staffers, who spent more time knifing 
each other in the press than focusing on the upstart 
from Illinois, did not help her. Neither, surprisingly, 
did her husband, who seems to have lost his fabled 
political touch. Running as a candidate of  the status 
quo rather than seeing that 2008 was an election where 
the American people desperately wanted change was a 
huge mistake, as was Clinton not adjusting to the com-
plicated Democratic party rules for the nomination 
process, a campaign system put into place by many of  
the same people (such as Harold Ickes) working for 
her. It is easy and correct to say that if  one makes this 
many fundamental mistakes, she should not be presi-
dent of  much of  anything.
While this is all certainly true and merits the discussion 
it is now receiving, I think it is more important and 
more instructive to focus on what Obama did right, 
than on what Clinton did so wrong. Before we move 
on to the conventions and the general election, it is 
important to look in a little detail at Obama’s amazing 
campaign for clues of  what is to come.
The Right Issue
While it is now second in terms of  voters concerns 
(well behind fears of  the spluttering American econ-
omy), Iraq was the issue that made Obama. His clear 
rejection of  the war was the only substantial difference 
that can be found between the remarkable alike policy 
proposals of  the Clinton and Obama teams. Especially 
early on, this opened political space for Obama on the 
left of  the Democratic party, as Hillary Clinton could 
never quite get away from her vote in support of  the 
Iraq war. She never fully understood as Obama did how 
much Iraq had turned the country off  from the politics 
as usual practiced in both parties, symbolized by the 
colossal failure of  the war. More importantly, it was an 
issue where Obama was in tune with the vast majority 
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of  Democratic voters and activists, who felt a red-hot 
anger about Iraq, an anger that translated into money 
and volunteers for Obama. That Hillary, typically, 
would not apologize for her vote reminded people of  
the intellectual arrogance and rigidity that they suspect-
ed in Clinton. Vitally, the Iraq war played a vital role in 
the crucial state of  Iowa, which Obama has recently 
acknowledged is the reason he won the nomination.
The Right State
More than anything else, Hillary Clinton based her 
campaign on a sense of  inevitability. Around Wash-
ington, amongst Democrats shopping for a candidate, 
it was commonly heard that if  you didn’t sign up for 
Hillary, and early, the train would leave the station. 
That is, if  you are not with us now, don’t expect a job 
in a Clinton administration later.
You can afford to be this arrogant only if  you win, 
early and big. That is where Iowa came in. The two 
upstarts challenging Hillary, Obama and John Edwards, 
knew they had to trip her up and do so quickly, or 
her campaign’s notion of  her inevitable victory in the 
primaries would prove itself  a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Obama wisely rejected pressure to establish a nation-
wide campaign early on, instead putting all his eggs in 
the Iowa basket.
Clinton, on the other hand, ignored pleas from within 
her campaign not to put up a fight in Iowa, as it was at 
the time the only state in the country where she trailed 
Obama. By not ignoring it, pointing out how close 
it lies to Obama’s home state of  Illinois, Clinton lost 
the nomination. Instead she gave battle to Obama on 
grounds entirely of  his own choosing.
For Iowa has always been as quirky as it is unrepresen-
tative. A state where the Democratic party skews left 
of  its national base, Iowa has always had a large paci-
fist streak, which played to Obama’s strength on Iraq. 
As it is a caucus state, Iowa is more about grass-roots 
organization than frontrunner status. For example in 
1976 it catapulted a then unknown Georgia governor, 
Jimmy Carter, to the front of  the Democratic pack. 
Obama, having invested all he had in Iowa, won a 
victory that shattered the myth of  Clinton invincibility, 
which had formed the basis of  her campaign. For all 
her tenacity, Clinton never truly overcame this devas-
tating initial blow, where Edwards knocked her into a 
shocking third-place finish.
The Right Tactics
While the Clinton team ran a good 20th century 
campaign, Obama ran the first 21st century campaign. 
Where Howard Dean and his chief  campaign staffer, 
Joe Trippi, had just begun to understand the power of  
the internet to connect people and facilitate fund-rais-
ing, it was the Obama staff  who transformed this in-
sight into tactical brilliance. Realizing the goal was not 
to ask Wall Street fat cats for the maximum they could 
give (which amounts to only several thousand dollars, 
not much in terms of  a modern campaign’s needs), but 
rather the goal must be to energize supporters, make 
them stakeholders in the campaign, ask them for small 
donations, but do so repeatedly.
This great insight has allowed Obama to raise more 
than $250 million, dwarfing all previous campaign 
totals. That makes him a multinational corporation, 
not merely a candidate. But more impressive is the 
fact that the individual average giving to Obama is so 
low; just over one million individuals have given small 
amounts of  money to him, some of  them repeatedly, 
as with the internet and the chat rooms for Obama 
that his campaign has engendered, they feel connected 
to this larger grass-roots movement. The Obama team 
have taken a peculiarly American tradition of  an in-
surgent candidate appearing from nowhere (think the 
young William Jennings Bryan, Wendell Wilkie, Gary 
Hart) and managed to keep the magic going, while tak-
ing the raw energy and excitement of  their candidate 
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and channeling it into a sustainable movement, some-
thing never really done before.
The Right Strategy
Unlike Hillary’s senior staff  who had written the 
arcane (and, lets face it, insane) Democratic Party rules 
and forgotten them, the Obama team predicated their 
tactics on the fact that winning was about acquiring 
delegates, and not just triumphing in the big states. 
Given the Democratic preference for proportional 
representation, all a candidate needed was to clear a 
paltry 15 percent threshold, and they would start ac-
cruing delegates.
That meant two basic and counterintuitive things for 
the Obama team. First, ‘winning’ states was less the 
goal than limiting Clinton’s chances for big victories. 
The best example of  this came late in confusing Texas, 
which manages to hold both a primary and a caucus 
for delegates on the same day. Hillary cleanly won the 
popular vote. However because of  the voting system, 
she had only the tiniest advantage in delegates over 
Obama. His team, focusing on the obscure system, 
carried the caucus. So in the end, despite winning 
more votes in Texas than Obama, Clinton actually lost 
ground to him there in terms of  delegates.
Obama focused on caucuses in out-of-the-way places 
like the mountain west, that had never before seen 
a sustained political effort for their delegates, while 
Clinton followed the more traditional route of  trying 
to win big states, turning this into an unstoppable wave 
of  momentum. Caucuses are harder to organize than 
primaries; here Obama, with his background as a local 
community organizer, felt comfortable pursuing such 
a local strategy, this time across the country. In the end, 
it was victories in places like Kansas, Mississippi, Vir-
ginia, and Nevada (where he again won more delegates 
despite Clinton carrying the popular vote), not known 
as important political contests, which carried him over 
the top.
For one good way to look at the contest is to divide 
it into pre- and post-Super Tuesday. Before the be-
ginning of  February the two candidates had roughly 
the same number of  delegates. After February, with 
Clinton closing strongly, they had approximately equal 
numbers of  delegates. But the month of  February 
won Barack Obama the nomination, as he triumphed 
in 11 straight contests, in out-of-the-way places like 
the District of  Columbia, Wisconsin, Virginia, Wash-
ington, and Maine. While his team had planned for 
the race to go on a long time, well after Super Tuesday, 
the Clinton staff, with a typical mix of  arrogance and 
incompetence, expected a knockout blow then. As 
such, in a tale as old as the Greeks, hubris set in; they 
had not bothered organizing in a serious way for the 
contests that came after. By weathering Super Tuesday 
by almost exactly tying Clinton in terms of  delegates, 
despite her big wins in New Jersey and California, 
Obama’s disciplined staff  had created the conditions 
for his roll through February, where he certainly won 
the election.
The Right Candidate
But as Howard Dean’s self-destruction in 2004 il-
lustrates, the best campaign team in the world still 
amounts to nothing if  its candidate is fatally flawed. 
Obama has already proved himself  an orator of  rare 
caliber. Having a president who is a skilled public 
speaker (the present occupant of  the White House 
notwithstanding), is a talent beloved of  the American 
people. Woodrow Wilson, FDR, JKF, and Ronald Rea-
gan are all remembered more fondly because of  their 
magical gift with words. Obama has a chance to enter 
this pantheon in a way the worthy but far more tongue-
tied John McCain can never hope to.
Likewise, Obama’s consistent stress on the notion of  
change from the beginning of  his run was particularly 
well-judged in terms of  the country’s mood. With sev-
enty-plus percent of  Americans thinking the country 
is heading in the wrong direction, Obama’s emphasis 
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both reflected and has given voice to this overall and 
powerful feeling within the United States that some-
thing has gone very wrong the past decade. Equally 
importantly, Obama acknowledges this grim truth, but 
has a sunny outlook, also in line with general Ameri-
can feelings, that while there are serious problems, the 
American people together have the ability to overcome 
them. Hard reality mixed with sunshine is a quintes-
sentially American message that Obama radiates.
Finally, there is the question of  race. Or better put, 
there is the non-question of  race with Obama. There 
has been a lot of  bad news for the United States over 
the past years: Iraq; the terrible damage done to Amer-
ican foreign policy by neo-conservatism; the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis; gas prices going through the roof; one 
American public diplomacy disaster after another; the 
rise of  new powers such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China). Obama offers some desperately needed 
good news. For he beguilingly, just by being who he is, 
offers Americans a chance to finally escape from the 
snake that has lingered in the garden of  the country 
since its founding; the problem of  race.
But he does so in the subtlest of  ways. One of  my 
favorite films is the great late 1960s social commen-
tary; Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner? In it a liberal, 
affluent San Francisco couple (immaculately played 
by the great Spencer Tracy and Katharine Hepburn) 
must confront the fact that their only daughter wants 
to marry a black man. But what makes the movie is 
not this shocking point for the time, however well-
acted. Rather it is the problem the younger black man, 
played to perfection by Sidney Poitier, has convincing 
his father, that the marriage should go ahead. Finally in 
exasperation, Poitier says, “Dad, you’re my father, I’ll 
always love you. But you see yourself  as a black man. 
And I see myself  … as a man.”
That is what Obama promises to jaded, white, sub-
urban voters, sickened by the general disasters of  
the past few years. He is a man who is running for 
president who happens to be black, and not (as Jesse 
Jackson was) a black man running for president. There 
is a world of  difference between the two positions; 
one a sign of  racial identification that has long ham-
strung America, the other a symbol that even this most 
ingrained American blight can be transcended, can 
be moved beyond. It is a very subconscious dream to 
aspire to, but no less powerful in the collective Ameri-
can psyche for all that. Obama promises much, and his 
campaign has already delivered much.
And the race is only now just beginning.
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